Alas, I’m done with my first summer book.
I had said this book reads like a master’s thesis. Having finished it, It seems absolutely true. For those of us who are still undergraduate or don’t care much for that air of authority typical of high-echelon academia, this makes the book all the more worthwhile. At the same time, that also reduces (considerably) its appeal outside of people who are actively interested in this stuff, so despite the subject matter, the fact that you liked Roméo Dallaire’s book or even “softer” writers like Tom Friedman, won’t mean you’ll like this one.
But to get to the meat of it, the premise of the book, in comparing colonial governments of the past to more present peacekeeping exercises, is a very interesting one. After all, as Zisk argues, both were about transforming the local culture and government to one similar to the one at home. The first thing counterargument that comes to mind, that colonies were in fact exploratory in nature, and not by any means a selfless enterprise by the powers du jour, is somewhat dispelled by Zisk. Certainly methods and experience are a common thread for former colonial powers, if anyone remembers one of my first posts on British soldiers not wearing helmets in Iraq. But what really stuck in my mind was that the really interesting question here is not comparing A to B, as Zisk did, but actually seeing how A affects, if not causes, B. Then again, that’s just the historian side of me talking.
It was amazing to see how utilitarian our governments are. In Dallaire’s book for example, he pleaded the case with the UN that the “Hate Radio” in Rwanda needed to be jammed or shut down (clearly a violation of freedom of speech). I had no problems with it then nor now after reading Zisk’s book. It is interesting to see, however, how we’re willing to compromise our “liberal democratic values” in order to achieve a greater good. Now, this used to trouble me a lot until recently, but perhaps that’s what marks me as a radical moderate. Despite this, I still think I am far from, to paraphrase Austin’s quote from The Corporation , sucking Henry Kissinger’s pecker and worshipping realpolitik.
The book convincingly makes its case and I wholeheartedly agree with the premise that you can’t change societies forcefully (unless, as Zisk sharply notes, a generation goes by–easy for colonizers, not so for peacekeepers). And the lack of willpower and resources is more than established given every developed nation’s stinginess with money (who can forget “expired German rations” for UNAMIR) and political cowardice (unable to accept losses in a military mission). And while we all know about the UN’s unending and inefficient bureaucracy (vis-à-vis Belgian fruit spread for MINUSTAH), I am still wary of a unilateral mission entering a political lose-lose situation (“If it’s multilateral, it’s a victim of different interests. If it’s unilateral, it’s a victim of a lack of legitimacy).
Paradoxically, Zisk’s last chapter, devoted somewhat briskly to the “what then” question, didn’t sell me on “security-keeping”. Her argument, that these societies should be given basic stability and then left to fend for themselves, did not fully convince me of its effectiveness. This puts an amazing burden of responsibility on failed societies. (And this is admittedly my “white man’s burden” side talking.) I can’t imagine a security-keeping mission being supported by the world at large if its mandate by definition allows non-democratic governments to come to power. “Mission creep” becomes inherent to any such “security-keeping” move, and their interference into political matters, in my opinion, is unavoidable.
There was an epiphany about operational matters, however, that hit me. In thinking of the context of post-civil war societies such as Rwanda and Haiti and even East Timor, and given the inadequacy (and reluctance) of the regular military to perform peace-keeping or enforcing activities (nicely illustrated by Zisk), I wonder what would be the ideal peace-keeping force, willing and capable to perform the tasks at hand. In thinking about UNAMIR, and their capabilities, I wondered if something like the French Gendarmes or the Italian Carabinieri wouldn’t be adequate. The conclusion (so far) it’s that it’s a tragedy. To really have an effective para-military peacekeeping force, you’d need to create it from scratch (Jean-Pierre Leboeuf won’t leave Côte-D’Azur to peacekeep the Congo), but to do so, you’d require a level of will and financial means which will never come to the UN. John Bolton’s moustache would catch fire after his feroucious screams of “No UN Army!”
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