KC-45

What happens when the domestic shoo-in for a $40 billion contract for military aerial tankers loses to a foreign consortium? They put out a press release, of course.

But what to argue? Government misconduct? Nope. Problems with foreign involvement? Nope.

“No fair. Their plane is bigger than ours?”
DING DING DING

Comparison

As far as military contracting goes, truth be told, there isn’t a lot of consumer-style marketing involved. But it is, nonetheless, somewhat disappointing that after losing what was the most important US aerospace contract after the Joint Strike Fighter (you know which one–the plane that scares that can scare enemies into submission using its helmet alone), that Boeing would recycle its marketing bullet points when it is clear that their loss is the result of a far more complex problem than “mine’s bigger than yours.”

Comparing the A330 platform to the 767 is very much a non-sequitur. When the US Air Force puts out an RFP (as Brazil will do so soon for its multi-billion dollar FX2 project), they’re looking for the plane that fits their strategy the best. To simplify the matter, their choice of KC-30/45 seems to be one of “I’d rather carry more cargo and offload more fuel using less planes”. This is why for each of of Boeing’s selling points there is a clear, all-too-simple answer.

  • Fuel Cost: the KC-30/45 due to its size will undoubtedly burn more fuel per flight hour. However, its additional fuel capacity means less sorties (or flights) will need to be taken to offload the same amount of fuel.
  • Maintenance and infrastructure cost: C’mon meow, that’s highly subjective. Operating costs for more recently-designed aircraft tend to be lower. And just because it’s bigger, the offset in the lower quantity of aircraft will go a long way to reducing costs in items such as engine overhauls (and other big-ticket items.
  • Airfields: Funny thing is rarely ever do planes take off with full loads. More so than that, instances when the tanker is both carrying cargo and offloading fuel are rarer still. True, the 767 will be able to use more of its full capacity, but I suspect for the same amount of runway the KC-30/45 will be able to either take off with more fuel (mission #1) or more cargo (#2).
  • Fewer aircraft per field: Again goes back to a question of capacity vs. quantity.

It’s clear Boeing completely misjudged the RFP for this project. Had, say, the 777 been matched up against the KC-30/45 or even the larger 767-400 been lobbed as an alternative, Boeing might have had a chance. For a company that lost the JSF contract and has been in as many imbroglios as it has been recently (and on this very contract), I expected Boeing not to resort to discredited selling points and actually reform the RFP.

Lo-and-behold the RFP has been cancelled, and we’ll see another run-off between Boeing and Northrop-Grumman/EADS by the end of the year. Here’s to second chances.